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THE FUTURE OF FAMILY
Max D. Siegel*
INTRODUCTION
The State organizes society into families.  By legitimating certain
family forms, the State distributes legal protections and obligations,
enables economic and proprietary structures of power, and expresses
a vision of morality.1  Throughout an individual’s life, family may pro-
vide social and emotional support, purpose, and motivation.2  Outside
the home, family improves and reinforces community by stabilizing
government and lessening individual susceptibility to public indoctri-
nation.3  Family serves these purposes across generations while pre-
serving culture, language, and religion.4
More than other Western nations, the United States predicates
family formation—and therefore societal organization—on marriage.5
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1 See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 381 (2012).
The law is . . . integrally involved in constructing families by defining who can marry
whom (from same-sex couples to sixteen-year-olds), assigning parenthood and identifying
the father and mother, determining who can make decisions on behalf of a child, estab-
lishing when parental rights can and should be terminated, as well as by providing legal
protections for the privacy of relationships defined as families, protections for family
members based on their status, and a structure to allocate decision making with respect to
the parent, child, and state.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
2 See Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L. J. 1236,
1238 (2010) (explaining that families are institutions in which individuals form meaningful rela-
tionships and find support).
3 See id. at 1238 (arguing that families make totalitarianism less likely because
“[i]ndividuals with strong family ties are more likely to be capable of critical reflection about
organized political institutions; individuals who are family members before they are citizens are
less susceptible to organized public indoctrination.”).
4 However, the functions of family are historically dependent. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED xix (1977) (claiming that fam-
ily provides “a haven in private life, in personal relations” and “the last refuge of love and
decency” but that “[d]omestic life . . . seems increasingly incapable of providing these
comforts”).
5 See generally ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MAR-
RIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 115 (2009).
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Americans are fixated on marriage; adult Americans marry, divorce,
and remarry at younger ages and exponentially higher rates than any
other Western nation.6  Divorce, a possible symptom of American
individualism,7 is just as bona fide an American tradition, and rates of
divorce in the United States have always been higher than rates in
other Western nations.8  Habitual marriage and divorce create a soci-
ety of competition both within families—as each family must continu-
ously reconcile individual interests or fracture and reform—and
between the country’s values.
While it is much easier and more common to enter and end mar-
riage in the United States,9 for a significant minority of the nation,
entering marriage and potentially leaving it remain off limits.  Now, as
throughout American history, the State’s recognition of family is an
instrument of oppression, implicating and frequently subjugating both
individual liberty and group-level equality interests.  In the past, the
State restricted women’s pursuit of liberty and blocked gender equal-
ity because, according to the Supreme Court of the United States,
“[t]he constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood.”10  The State has leveraged family to manu-
Marriage [in the United States] would not, however, disappear in the early twenty-first
century.  Indeed, it would remain the most highly valued way of living one’s family life,
even though people spent less time actually being married than in the past.  It would
enjoy a resurgence of support as both the defenders of “traditional” marriage and the
advocates of same-sex marriage battled over how to define it.  Marriage would be greatly
changed in nature but still identifiable as a central part of American family life.  And it
would continue to have a more prominent role in the United States than in many other
Western countries.
Id.
6 See id. at 15-19 (detailing empirical comparisons of the United States and other Western
nations in the mid-1990s and concluding that “[w]hat all these statistics mean is that family life in
the United States involves more transitions than anywhere else,” including more marriage,
divorce, new partners, and cohabitation with children).  This process recommences much sooner
after divorce in the United States than it does in other countries. Id. at 15.
7 See generally id. at 4 (arguing that Americans are so prone to marriage and divorce due to
the competing values of marriage and individualism).
8 Id. (“In fact, the United States has one of the highest levels of both marriage and divorce
of any Western nation, and these rates appear to have been higher than in most other Western
countries since the early days of the nation.”).
9 Id. at 3 (observing that “in no other Western country is the waiting period for a no-fault
divorce so short”).
10 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (upholding a state’s denial of a married
woman’s license to practice law because “[t]he harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views
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facture rigid gender boundaries, facilitate rape, and subsume women’s
legal identities.11  At other times, courts have employed family as a
mechanism for social control by limiting property interests to discour-
age extramarital sex and denying legal pathways to inheritance based
on the non-marital status of children.12  In the context of slavery, fam-
ily signaled the dominance of whites over blacks as slaveholders com-
mandeered slaves’ liberty to form their most intimate relationships.13
Anti-miscegenation laws restricted the creation of family to foster
racial purity and maintain unequal conditions between races, and, out
of distaste for white women giving birth to non-white babies, legisla-
tors constrained adults’ autonomy to enter sexual relationships by
prohibiting interracial fornication.14 Today, international human rights
entities have recognized the founding of a family as a fundamental
right, and the barriers faced by most American sexual minorities15 in
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband”).
11 See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (QUEER IDEAS) 12-13 (2009) (describing feminists’ critiques of mar-
riage and explaining the law of coverture, the marital rape exception, and marriage’s regulation
of gender).
12 See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971) (finding that the interests of non-
marital children are “illicit and beyond the recognition of the law”).
13 See DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 28 (1997) (discussing slaveholders’ financial stake in male slaves’
marital choices and their intervention in slaves’ procreation within a State that did not recognize
marriages between slaves).
14 See id. at 268 (asserting that an overarching purpose of American law was to keep “the
white bloodline free from Black contamination” and that laws prohibiting interracial fornication
and miscegenation ensured that white women would give birth to the offspring of their white
husbands).
15 This Article uses the words ‘queer’ and ‘sexual minority’ to denote individuals who do
not identify with widespread legal and social notions of heterosexuality.  Heterosexuality is used
in its contemporary meaning of an intimate relationship between a biologically and socially iden-
tified man and woman—although the term was first used to identify “mental hermaphrodites”
and the so-called mental disorder of being attracted to both men and women. See James G.
Kiernan, Responsibility in Sexual Perversion, 3 CHICAGO MED. REC. 185, 198 n.30 (1892).  This
Article avoids the language of gay and straight because sexuality and sexual identity exist on
continua. See ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 639 (1948)
(“The living world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects.  The sooner we learn this
concerning human sexual behavior the sooner we shall reach a sound understanding of the real-
ity of sex.”).  For a more in-depth analysis of sub-categorizations of non-heterosexuals, see gen-
erally Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997 (2012) (describing bisexual
erasure in modern legal developments, examining the importance of definition and language for
enhancing rights, and introducing terminology such as “general orientation” and “specific orien-
tation” to describe bisexuals).
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pursuit of State recognition of their familial bonds are powerful mani-
festations of group-wide subordination.16
Modern advancements in queer17 rights, however, suggest a new
kind of family that gives individuals the power to organize themselves
within society.18  Opponents of enhancing queer rights contend that an
expanded recognition of family would reconceive the “traditional”
family,19 which this Article defines as the marriage of one man and
one woman followed by cohabitation with their mutually and exclu-
sively conceived offspring.  As former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum
put it, the traditional family is “a family constituted by a mother and a
father who have committed themselves to each other in lifelong mar-
riage, together with their children.”20  Santorum further explained that
“[t]his is ‘traditional,’ but the reason it is a traditional relationship is
because it is fundamentally natural.”21  This Article disagrees with
16 See Stuart Bridge, Marriage and divorce: the regulation of intimacy, in FAMILY LAW:
ISSUES, DEBATES, POLICY 9 (Jonathan Herring ed., 2001) (acknowledging that the European
Convention on Human Rights guaranteed the right to found a family and that English courts
should expect challenges to the country’s domestic legislation on marriage).
17 See supra note 15. R
18 This reorganization would not wholly eradicate all distressing elements of the State’s
regulation of family, but it is a necessary step to improve society’s response to the complexities
of contemporary familial bonds. See Froma Walsh, The New Normal: Diversity and Complexity
in 21st-Century Families, in NORMAL FAMILY PROCESSES: GROWING DIVERSITY AND COMPLEX-
ITY 3, 3 (4th ed., 2011) (“As families have become increasingly varied over a lengthening life
course, our conceptions of normality must be examined and our very definition of ‘family’ must
be expanded to encompass a broad spectrum and fluid reshaping of relational and households
patterns.”).
19 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930 (N.D. Cal.), stay denied, 702
F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay granted, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010),
motion to vacate stay denied, 639 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2011) (summarizing the argument propo-
nents made in favor of a ballot measure defining marriage as between one man and one woman
and reiterating that it “ protects our children from being taught in public schools that ‘same-sex
marriage’ is the same as traditional marriage”); George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional
Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 603 (1999) (claiming that “validation of same-sex marriages would
eviscerate society’s endorsement of traditional marriage”); see also CNN Wire Staff, Rights
group: Ugandan lawmaker revives anti-gay bill, CNN.COM (Feb. 8, 2012), http://arti-
cles.cnn.com/2012-02-08/africa/world_africa_uganda-anti-gay-bill_1_anti-homosexuality-bill-
david-bahati-anti-gay-bill?_s=PM:AFRICA (quoting a Ugandan lawmaker pushing legislation to
make same-sex sexual activity punishable by death because “[t]his is a piece of legislation that is
needed in this country to protect the traditional family”).
20 RICK SANTORUM, IT TAKES A FAMILY: CONSERVATISM AND THE COMMON GOOD 28
(2005). But see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE
LAW 1015 (2d ed., 2005) (noting that marriage and blood relationships remain important to fami-
lies but have given way to choice).
21 SANTORUM, supra note 20, at 28. Thus, according to Santorum, the liberal vision of R
society as one of “‘individuals’—not men and women and children” is false because “[t]he prom-
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Santorum’s assessment of the cause of traditional family roles and
instead contemplates gender as a social institution while invoking the
man-woman binary as a matter of rhetoric.22  But the opposition has
something right; enhanced queer rights will erase the traditional fam-
ily by rewriting its legal and social dimensions, resulting in laws and
policies that track more closely with familial bonds outside a hetero-
normative, man-woman binary.23  Sexual minorities are not the only
threat to the traditional family—“radical feminists succeeded in
undermining the traditional family and convincing women that profes-
sional accomplishments are the key to happiness”24—but this Article
proposes that sexual minorities are the greatest current threat to the
traditional family.
Although past legal scholars typically wrote about sexual minor-
ity rights in terms of what these rights could mean for the non-hetero-
sexual subjects of reform,25 recent scholarship has turned to the
broader conceptual implications of new civil rights and—because of
the Equal Protection Clause’s waning vitality—recast the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the necessary mechanism for
minority groups to attain equality.26  This Article explores the ramifi-
ise of the natural law is that we will be happiest, and freest, when we follow the law built into our
nature as men and women,” and “nature is nature, and the freedom to choose against the natural
law is not really freedom at all.” Id. at 28-29.
22 See generally Patricia Yancey Martin, Gender As Social Institution, 82 SOC. FORCES 1249
(2004) (discussing gender as a social institution).
23 See Karen E. Lovaas & Mercilee M. Jenkins, Introduction: Setting the Stage, in SEXUALI-
TIES & COMMUNICATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE: A READER 8 (Karen Lovaas & Mercilee M. Jen-
kins eds., 2006) (defining heteronormativity as the beliefs and practices that privilege
heterosexuality and “a useful term for expressing the ways in which heterosexuality has become
more than one of a number of modes of expressing one’s sexuality; it exposes heterosexuality as
a social institution that sanctions heterosexuality as the only ‘normal,’ ‘natural’ expression of
sexuality” and the only sexual orientation “to need no explanation”).
24 SANTORUM, supra note 20, at 95-96. R
25 See generally Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History,
79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993) (tracing the history of queer rights in the United States and observ-
ing that prior to Bowers v. Hardwick, the rights of sexual minorities were omitted from constitu-
tional law classes while subsequent coverage discussed queer rights in terms of sexual minorities’
equal protection and due process claims).  Outside the rights context, the broader academic
community has long examined the impact of queers on society. See, e.g., KATH WESTON, FAMI-
LIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 1-2 (1991) (exploring the significance of extending
the concept of family for sexual minorities and, as a cultural anthropologist engaged in field
research, examining whether sexual minorities will affect “kinship relations and social relations
in the United States as a whole”).
26 See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748
(2011) (arguing that “[t]he Court’s commitment to civil rights has not been pressed out, but
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cations of enhanced queer rights outside the lives of sexual minorities,
examining how civil rights advancements stand to dismantle exclu-
sionary notions affecting all families.  In light of the rapid growth of
familial creation in the context of donated embryos, ova, and sperm,
this Article demonstrates how queer liberation27 could spark advance-
ments for donor-conceived family communities, which are familial
groups that have connected on the basis of donated reproductive
materials.28  In so doing, this Article argues that social progress has
too often fallen to the limitations of a normatively appealing concep-
tualization of family—one that has unfairly benefited the heterosexual
majority and which courts must now redefine for the sake of univer-
sally shared liberty interests.
This Article contemplates the potential of American society to
inject individualism into family beyond the potential to divorce.  Part I
highlights dignity as the historical and contemporary link between the
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Part II explains that liberty-as-dignity is a prom-
ising mechanism for the attainment of queer rights because, by
promoting the rights of all individuals rather than focusing on the dif-
ferential treatment of minority groups, advocates for queer rights can
employ liberty-as-dignity to leverage shared values while avoiding
various criticisms of equality-based arguments.  Part III harnesses
donor-conceived family communities to delineate the contemporary
boundaries of the law of family formation and assert that current legal
rather over to collateral doctrines” and claiming that the Supreme Court of the United States
has moved from group-based equality claims to individual liberty claims).
27 This article employs queer liberation to reference liberty for sexual minorities beyond
assimilation into heterosexual society. See generally Michael Warner, Introduction, in FEAR OF
A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY vii, vii (Michael Warner ed., 1993)
(explaining that the left’s traditions of social and political theory have failed to ask what queers
want and instead “posited and naturalized a heterosexual society”).
28 See Cahn, supra note 1, at 368-69 (claiming that approximately one million families have R
been created over the last half-century through egg and sperm donation and that legal doctrine
has failed to keep pace with the needs of donor-conceived family communities).  This Article
employs the term donation even though so-called donors are typically compensated.  For an
analysis of the terms donor and vendor, see Bonnie Steinbock, Payment for Egg Donation and
Surrogacy, 71 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 255, 255-56 (2004) (describing the discrepancy between the
view that the term donor is oxymoronic when referring to compensated gamete providers and
the argument that donor is the correct label because these individuals are simply being compen-
sated for time, risk, and inconvenience).  Like Steinbock, this Article uses the term donation due
to its common usage. Id. at 256 (remarking that she employs the term donation “not because I
want to prejudge the question of whether payment is for the product or compensation, still less
to prejudge the question of moral acceptability, but simply because it is accepted usage”).
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standards fail to meet the needs of this swiftly growing subpopulation.
Donor-conceived family communities signify the potential trajectory
of family redefinition if queer rights continue to advance, showcasing
why queer liberation’s potential to redefine family is vital beyond the
lives of sexual minorities.  Finally, Part IV argues that liberty-as-dig-
nity connects rights across society and, by moving all communities
away from the traditional family, a queer redefinition of family would
unleash personal agency in the legal construction of citizens’ familial
lives.
I. LIBERTY-AS-DIGNITY
The Fourteenth Amendment promises citizenship to “[a]ll per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States.”29  The United States
adopted the amendment to ensure minorities’ participation in society,
and the Supreme Court has applied the guarantees of equal treatment
and equal liberty to remedy group-level subordination for more than a
century.30  Despite the bold language of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence that “all men are created equal,”31 and a pronouncement in the
1950s that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains
an equality principle,32 the judiciary did not recognize a general guar-
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Id.  See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 112-13 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“A citi-
zen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he
chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen . . . .
If a man be denied full equality before the law, he is denied one of the essential rights of citizen-
ship as a citizen of the United States.”).
30 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process
Clause, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 99, 101-02 (2007) (claiming that a review of the last century’s due
process jurisprudence reveals that anti-subordination is the driving force of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s core principle [is] equal citizenship, which
gives every citizen a right to be treated as a respected and responsible participant in community
public life.”).
31 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
32 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (recognizing that while the Fifth Amend-
ment does not contain an equal protection clause, due process and equal protection, “both stem-
ming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive” and “discrimination may
be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”).
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antee of equality in the Constitution of the United States until after
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.33  Liberty may have slightly
deeper roots in the American tradition than equality both in terms of
the Constitution and national history,34 but the liberty-based claims of
the Due Process Clause and the group-based equality claims of the
Equal Protection Clause have been interlocked by the Court in what
Professor Laurence H. Tribe has termed “a legal double helix.”35  The
Court has often relied on the Equal Protection Clause to overturn
statutes when liberty interests were also at stake.36  Similarly, the
Court has leveraged the Due Process Clause to further equality, and
this comingling of due process and equal protection has allowed the
Court to assess a concern that both links and transcends liberty and
equality: the protection of dignity.37
Dignity is a tricky concept, especially in American jurisprudence.
Dignity has a long history in the law and among political philosophers
with a legacy of exploration by luminaries such as Cicero,38 Emmanuel
Kant,39 Thomas Paine,40 and Alexander Hamilton.41  In the United
States, all levels of the state and federal judiciary have invoked dignity
33 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 441 (6th ed. 2009).
34 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”); THE DECLARA-
TION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”). See also Rebecca L. Brown,
Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 1494-95 (2002) (remarking that viewed his-
torically, liberty has at least as strong a pedigree in the United States as equality).
35 See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897-98 (2004) (asserting that a careful attendance to
court’s rulings under substantive due process reveal a narrative “in which due process and equal
protection, far from having separate missions entailing different inquires, are profoundly inter-
locked in a legal double helix.”).
36 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down an Oklahoma law
allowing the forced sterilization of criminals on Equal Protection Clause grounds although the
Court also recognized reproduction as a basic civil right).
37 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 749 (arguing that “dignity” is a long overdue term linking R
liberty and equality and that the Court has not abided by the distinction between liberty and
equality).
38 See CICERO, DE OFFICIIS I 30 (William McCartney ed. & trans., Edinburgh 1798) (44).
39 See IMMANUEL KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN 434 (Akademie
Ausgabe Bd. IV, 1911 (1785)).
40 See THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 41 (Gregory Claeys ed., Hackett Pubs. 1992)
(1791).
41 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 27-31 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
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in varying contexts, including constitutional theory, speech law, intel-
lectual property law, and even entertainment law,42 and the Court has
used dignity to denote institutional status, personal integrity, collec-
tive virtue, equality, and liberty.43  Accordingly, dignity is best under-
stood as multidimensional and situational; it is a word without one
core meaning but rather different meanings in different contexts.44
When applied to equality, the Court has used dignity to characterize
the unconstitutional experiences of minorities that arise from differen-
tial treatment.45  Applied to liberty, dignity has indicated respect for
an individual’s capacity to make decisions in furtherance of personal
identity as well as respect for those decisions once they are made.46
The Court has associated dignity with increasingly expansive lib-
erty rights.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,47 the Court identified the constitutionally protected liberty
interest at stake during a challenge to Pennsylvania’s Abortion Con-
trol Act as one “involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity,”
which included “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”48  More
recently, in Sternberg v. Carhart,49 the Court ruled that a statute
criminalizing forms of late-term abortion was unconstitutional and
emphasized the importance of “equal liberty” in concluding that “a
law that forbids abortion would condemn many American women to
lives that lack dignity, depriving them of equal liberty.”50  The Court’s
42 See Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 66, 70 (2011)
(explaining that “[j]urists at all levels—state, federal, trial, and appellate—are referencing the
right to dignity” and that courts’ references to human dignity have arisen in various contexts,
ranging from “constitutional theory, to criminal law, free speech law, intellectual property law,
and to entertainment law.”).
43 For a thorough assessment of the Court’s use of dignity, see generally Leslie Meltzer
Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011).
44 See id. at 186-89 (proposing a new understanding of dignity using philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s context-driven approach to understanding language).
45 See id. at 203-05 (examining the Court’s equal protection cases since the 1940s and con-
cluding that “the Court relied on equality as dignity to direct attention to the nature of the harm
that marginalized individuals or groups experience as the result of differential treatment”).
46 See id. at 208-12 (explaining that liberty-as-dignity calls for respect for individual choice
and for individuals due to their capacity to choose).
47 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
48 Id. at 851.
49 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
50 Id. at 920-22.
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GMC\23-2\GMC203.txt unknown Seq: 10 19-FEB-13 14:17
186 CIVIL RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23:2
decision in Lawrence v. Texas51 further expanded the limits of liberty-
as-dignity.52  While famously invalidating Texas’s anti-sodomy statute
on substantive due process grounds, the Court explained that the Con-
stitution protects “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,”
reiterating the “mystery of life” passage in Casey and concluding that
sexual minorities may “retain their dignity as free persons” when
forming relationships in their private lives because “liberty protected
by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice.”53  Thus, the Court now administers substantive due process,
which had once protected only those rights represented throughout
history,54 so that “persons in every generation can invoke its principles
in their own search for greater freedom.”55
By using dignity as a pathway linking liberty and equality, the
Court has transcended various restraints on equality jurisprudence to
address group-level subjugation.  The Court has narrowed the reach
of the Equal Protection Clause over the last few decades by restricting
the variety of classes it protects, lessening the scope of constitutional
safeguards for protected classes, and extinguishing the power of Con-
gress to execute the Equal Protection Clause through civil rights legis-
lation potentially permissible under Section Five56 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.57  Simultaneously, the Court has eschewed equality
claims, such as those made in the context of abortion, while protecting
dignity through individual liberty.58  This shift has allowed the Court
to sidestep concerns about the incessantly fracturing, ever-diversifying
51 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
52 See Henry, supra note 43, at 210-12 (discussing the dignity implications of Casey and the R
potential interpretation of Lawrence to strengthen liberty-as-dignity).
53 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 573-74.
54 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988).
55 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
56 Section Five allows Congress to promote civil rights through passing legislation by giving
Congress “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
57 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 755-73 (analyzing how the Court has restricted equality R
guarantees over the past decades when “it has limited the number of formally protected classifi-
cations, it has curtailed its solicitude for classes within already protected classifications, and it
has restricted Congress’s power to enact antidiscrimination legislation”).
58 See id. at 781-83 (discussing how the Court has afforded some protection for women’s
access to abortion under liberty-based claims while ignoring the implications of abortion as a
matter of equality).
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markers of identity through which equality-based claims are made.59
Moreover, the relocation of equality in constitutional liberty has
shielded the judiciary from the accusation that legal intervention in
equal protection matters is no longer necessary in light of what some
consider a racially aware, gender-conscious political system.60
II. THE PROTECTION OF DIGNITY ADVANCES QUEER LIBERTY
AND EQUALITY
The shift from historically mediated liberty interests and particu-
larized group-based equality claims toward expansive dignity rights
presents an important opportunity for sexual minorities.  Queer liber-
ation no longer hinges on being equal to heterosexuals but rather
emanates from universally applicable claims of individual worth
outside the territory of gender and race.61  These liberty-grounded dig-
nity claims are universally personalized and evoke international
human rights in place of American identity politics.62  Liberty-
grounded dignity claims circumvent the rhetoric of “special rights,”
asking not for courts to carve out exceptions for sexual minorities but
instead to make decisions that reflect the rights of every individual.63
Especially significant for minorities within sexual minorities, liberty is
not a matter of essentializing facets of a group’s identity and therefore
does not institutionalize stereotypes true for some, but not all, non-
heterosexuals.64
59 See id. at 747-48 (asserting that pluralism anxiety due to the sheer variety of groups of
people in the United States has led the Court to deny protection to new groups, betray the
protection it has provided other groups, and restrict Congress’ ability to pass civil rights
legislation).
60 See Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection in a Democracy of
Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281, 283 (2002) (arguing against strict scrutiny in equal protection
controversies in light of political protections for minorities).
61 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 793 (emphasizing the difference between arguments in R
favor of marriage equality and the right to gay marriage and distinguishing the assertion that
“[g]ays should have the right to marry because straights have the right to marry and gays are
equal to straights” from “[a]ll adults should have the right to marry the person they love”).
62 See id. at 794 (explaining that liberty claims are more persuasive because they reach a
higher level of generality and evoke human rights, which is particularly appealing to the liberta-
rian impulses of some conservatives).
63 See id. (arguing that equality claims are more likely to sound like “special rights” argu-
ments associated with group-based civil rights and that liberty claims more successfully foster
empathy).
64 See id. at 795 (explaining that an “advantage of liberty-based dignity analysis is that it is
less likely to essentialize identity” and thus responds to “[s]uch ‘left critiques of the left’ [that]
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Even beyond Lawrence, courts have used dignity to advance the
rights of sexual minorities.  For example, in 2008, the Supreme Court
of California cited dignity while justifying the expansion of marriage
to California’s non-heterosexuals.65  With In re Marriage Cases, the
court explained that even though California’s state constitution did
not enumerate an express right to dignity, the constitution promised
basic substantive legal rights associated with marriage and guaranteed
that an individual could “establish—with the person with whom the
individual has chosen to share his or her life—an officially recognized
and protected family . . . entitled to the same respect and dignity
accorded a union traditionally designated as marriage.”66  The court
continued that essential to this right to establish a State-recognized
family was the “right to have their family relationship accorded dig-
nity and respect equal to that accorded other officially recognized
families.”67  Particularly significant to the court was protecting human
dignity through advancing queer liberty and equality, reasoning that
“reserving the historic designation of ‘marriage’ exclusively for oppo-
site-sex couples poses at least a serious risk of denying the family rela-
tionship of same-sex couples such equal dignity and respect.”68
Moving forward, advocates for sexual minorities could harness
dignity to break down existing anti-marriage and anti-adoption laws
and cultivate more inclusive civil rights legislation in Congress.  Mod-
ern due process disassembles state impediments to same-sex family
formation because, with Lawrence as clear precedent, dignity-based
liberty interests deserve protection from the State’s attempts to con-
trol personal relationships.69  Similarly, any limitations that the Court
could place on pro-queer rights legislation passed under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment would be weakened by judicial recog-
argue that when the courts protect a trait as part of a group’s identity, they strengthen the very
stereotypes they mean to disestablish.”).
65 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399 (2008), superseded by constitutional amendment,
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
66 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399 (emphasis omitted).
67 Id. at 400.
68 Id.
69 See Tribe, supra note 35, at 1935 (claiming at stake in Lawrence was the assertion that R
the State may control a personal relationship and the case shows “that once a ‘severe intrusion’
into a protected ‘freedom of association’ is established, not even a neutral rule of general appli-
cability narrowly protecting an otherwise weighty state interest . . . can save the state’s usurpa-
tion of the association’s autonomy from condemnation as an infringement of substantive due
process.”).
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nition that—whether heterosexual or non-heterosexual—human
beings have value-forming and value-transmitting relationships within
the ambit of due process.70  Thus, legislation that ensures same-sex
marriage, guarantees inclusive and responsive health services, expands
workplace benefits, facilitates parenthood, and otherwise advances
the liberty of non-heterosexuals is more attainable and sustainable in
the Court’s continuing embrace of dignity.
III. DONOR-CONCEIVED FAMILY COMMUNITIES AND THE END OF
TRADITION
Sexual minorities are not the only beneficiaries of equality
through liberty-as-dignity.  Donor-conceived family communities have
much to gain from a broader legal recognition of individuals’ shared
intimacies.71  By using liberty-as-dignity to advance their own equality,
queer liberation has the power to rewrite legal tropes for all families
within society and, in the case of donor-conceived family communi-
ties, expand the law to accommodate new and evolving familial
structures.
A. The Unmet Legal Needs of Donor-conceived
Family Communities
Advancements in assisted reproductive technology and increased
access to third-party sperm, ova, and embryos have galvanized family
formation for non-heterosexual, infertile, and other nontraditional
parents.72  These advancements have fostered “donor-conceived fami-
lies,” which are families that employ donor materials to create new
members.73  In addition, as assisted reproductive technology has facili-
tated birth for an increasing number of children, more individuals
70 See id. (explaining that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence suggested “the
globally unifying theme of shielding from state control value-forming and value-transmitting
relationships”) (emphasis added).
71 See Cahn, supra note 1, at 405 (explaining that “explicit regulation that helps develop R
donor-conceived family communities can help families, and family law, constructively realize
their goals of promoting intimacy” and that “[t]he law’s silence about these families provides
space for only limited contact”).
72 See id. at 374 (observing that reproductive technology has enhanced family formation
outside the context of two heterosexual parents).
73 See id. at 369 (defining “donor-conceived families” as those “using third-party gametes
[to create] a new family member and [form] ties between partners”).
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have sought out others with whom they share extra-familial ties; look-
ing beyond their immediate milieu, these individuals have formed
“donor-conceived family communities.”74  Originating from the uterus
or gametes of the same third-party donor,75 these communities defy
traditional notions of family because they share emotional bonds and
often biology but not households or any legal obligations or
privileges.76
As with other non-traditional routes of family formation, the
donation of embryos, sperm, and ova is a phenomenon of pronounced
controversy.  Donation in an assisted reproduction framework, while
banned in others countries, is probably within the realm of constitu-
tionally protected privacy interests.77  Although legal, donation is fre-
quently viewed as undesirable, immoral, and irresponsible because it
introduces third parties into the unity of marriage, contributes to the
incidence of unwed pregnant mothers as well as motherless and
fatherless children, and implies that parenthood is a duty so evanes-
cent that it can be transferred from one individual to the next.78  Crit-
74 See id. at 368-69 (examining the growing number of individuals who form donor-con-
ceived family communities).
75 In vitro fertilization might utilize the patients’ own gametes.
76 See id. at 369 (describing the emotional ties shared within “donor-conceived family com-
munities” and explaining that they do not share households or dependencies).
77 See Steinbock, supra note 28, at 256 (“In Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Japan, the use R
of donor eggs is illegal.  It is unlikely that egg donation could be banned in the United States,
because such a ban would probably violate the constitutional right to privacy.”).  The Supreme
Court of the United States has located a constitutional right to privacy in various decisions relat-
ing to procreative autonomy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (recognizing a
qualified right to abortion based in the constitutional right to privacy that the Court had previ-
ously acknowledged in a long history of cases); Eistenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972)
(recognizing that unmarried individuals’ decisions whether to use contraception fell within their
constitutionally protected privacy interests); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (recognizing that married individuals’ decisions whether to use contraception fell within
their constitutionally protected privacy interests); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(describing marriage and procreation as “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race” and a statute delimiting procreation through sterilization as involving “one of the basic
civil rights of man”). See generally Lainie M. C. Dillon, Comment, Conundrums with Penum-
bras: The Right to Privacy Encompasses Non-Gamete Providers Who Create Preembryos with the
Intent to Become Parents, 78 WASH. L. REV. 625, 628-33 (2003) (examining the Court’s progres-
sive recognition of privacy in constitutional cases and arguing that the right to privacy protects
intimate decisions relating to procreation).
78 See Steinbock, supra note 28, at 256-57 (distinguishing between morality and legality and R
describing various critiques of egg donation).
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ics also argue that donation commodifies the family by reducing
reproduction to a series of marketplace transactions.79
These arguments coincide with enormous challenges that donor-
conceived family communities must face before they can even begin
to form.  State laws typically attempt to allocate parental rights to
those individuals with the intent to rear the child, but these laws are
not uniform concerning the legal responsibility of providers of
embryos, sperm, and ova to resulting offspring.80  Simultaneously,
contractually and culturally mediated secrecy impedes offspring in
most attempts to seek out their kin.81  Even when offspring could
access this information, centralized registries, as in the case of adop-
tion, do not exist.82
Donor-conceived family communities face numerous other barri-
ers to State legitimization of their relationships.  Courts have insisted
that children have one set of two parents—the biological mother and
biological father as defaults—who possess all parental rights and
responsibilities.83  Despite an ongoing insistence that biological corre-
lates define family,84 the Court has questioned whether it is the biolog-
ical connection itself the law values or rather “the historic respect—
indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term—traditionally
accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family.”85
Regardless, children have had considerably less legal power than their
79 See id. at 263-64 (elucidating arguments that donation threatens the family by introduc-
ing destructive market forces into the familial sphere).
80 See Cahn, supra note 1, at 387 (explaining that states have attempted to allocate parental R
rights to the intending parents but that “there is no universal answer to the question of the legal
relationship between donor and offspring”).
81 See id. at 391 (describing the multiple layers of secrecy involved in assisted reproductive
technology).
82 See id. at 392 (pointing out that unlike adoption, states do not maintain central registries
for donor-conceived offspring).
83 See id. at 402 (explaining the traditional view that parenthood is a unitary bundle of
rights shared by two, and only two, individuals) (citing Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1991
(2010); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124
(1989); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (Cal. 1993)).  This insistence could be due in
large part to the desire to prevent poverty and children’s reliance on the State. See, e.g., Martha
Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodifi-
cation, 82 N.C. L. REV, 1, 32-33 (2003) (acknowledging that children’s need for financial support
is a potential justification “to impose a standard of two-biological parent families for children”).
84 See Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L.
REV. 347, 348 (2008) (arguing that “even as society has committed itself to autonomous choice in
shaping family relationships, it has seemingly become more obsessed with the biological (and
especially the genetic) correlates of family”).
85 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GMC\23-2\GMC203.txt unknown Seq: 16 19-FEB-13 14:17
192 CIVIL RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23:2
parents or the State to make decisions that affect the family, including
the ability to recognize their half-siblings.86
These barriers leave numerous needs unmet.  Formalizing donor-
conceived family communities could improve child welfare by rein-
forcing sibling and familial associational connections, reduce state
dependency through expanding the enforceability of support obliga-
tions, ease the legal administration of property, empower appropri-
ately situated surrogate decision makers, and legitimate emotionally
vital personal bonds.87  Mature adults resulting from or receiving
donor gametes should, like adoptees and adoptive parents in some
states, have access to information about their donor and potential sib-
lings for a better understanding of their predisposition to certain dis-
eases and other negative health outcomes.88  Donor-recipient
agreements need uniformity, and donor-offspring relationships
require clarity to ensure fairness to donors.89  Furthermore, donor-
conceived family communities should have the infrastructure to form
legal bonds if the parties involved so desire because, in the context of
serving the best interest of the child, the State’s obligation to maxi-
mize human capabilities includes respecting the freedom of individu-
als to make life choices.90
B. Extending Queer Advancements to Donor-conceived Family
Communities
Donor-conceived family communities are the future of family,
embodying a new frontier for the law and sparking novel questions
about State recognition of families outside the contexts of husband-
86 See Cahn, supra note 1, at 396 (“The failure to recognize sibling associational rights R
provides yet another example of the paucity of children’s rights.”).
87 See id. at 417 (eschewing a laundry list of policy prescriptions but discussing donor-con-
ceived family community members taking family and medical leave for one another, inheriting
one another’s property, acting as surrogate decision makers, and serving as legal guardians).
88 See id. at 413 (arguing that adults should have access to state-created donor registries).
89 See id. at 416 (exploring the need for legal clarity in the relationship between donors and
the families they help create).
90 See id. at 422-23 (explaining that scholars have emphasized the responsibility to maxi-
mize human capabilities and that the capabilities approach underscores “the freedom of individ-
ual to achieve the life that they would choose for themselves”) (citing AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE,
WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 30-31 (1982); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 144
(First Edition Books 2000) (1999); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Human Capabilities, Female Human
Beings, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITES 61, 82-83
(Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995)).
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wife and parent-child relationships.91  They generate new questions
concerning the most critical characteristics of modern family law
because they exist far beyond the reach of the traditional family.92
They ask courts to reorient all family around the best interests of the
child by bucking the judiciary’s tendency to dovetail its recognition of
evolving family structures to parents’ due process rights.93  Moreover,
they sidestep marriage’s tendency to reinforce dyadic distributions of
rights by defusing archaic but contemporarily significant legal tropes,
such as the marital presumption of paternity.94
Fortunately, sexual minorities have already begun to erode the
concept of the traditional family.  Queers are strategically poised to
transform family law because custody, visitation, and other family law
matters implicate sexual minority status more often than any other
form of judicial proceeding.95  The ongoing extension of State recogni-
tion of families to include socially infertile sexual minorities untethers
groups like donor-conceived family communities from numerous legal
tropes, with the Minnesota Court of Appeals having provided a clear
example in LaChapelle v. Mitten when it recognized and honored
91 Id. at 370 (“Recognition of connections between different donor-conceived families does
not involve sexual intimacy between adults as in the line of cases culminating in Lawrence v.
Texas, nor authority within the parent-child relationship as in Troxel v. Granville, nor the type of
traditional family recognized in Michael H. v. Gerald D., which upheld the marital presumption
notwithstanding strong evidence that the husband was not the biological father.”) (citing Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 578-79 (2003); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000);
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115, 131-32 (1989)).
92 See Cahn, supra note 1, at 370 (explaining that “donor-conceived family communities R
contest traditional assumptions about the state’s role in family law, the goods that the state
should seek to further, and the very definition of family”).
93 For example, in Troxel v. Granville, while recognizing that “nationwide enactment of
nonparental visitation statutes is assuredly due, in some part, to the States’ recognition of [ ]
changing realities of the American family,” the Supreme Court held that a Washington statute
allowing courts to order visitation for any person when visitation would serve the best interest of
the child violated the due process rights of a mother after a trial judge ordered visitation for a
child’s grandparents in excess of her wishes.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64, 72-73 (2000).
94  See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 111-12 (1989) (discarding a daughter’s appeal
in support of her biological father’s filiation action to establish paternity and visitation and
upholding a California statute limiting potential rebuttals of the marital presumption to the hus-
band or wife within the marriage because the biological father and daughter failed to show that
either his or her “‘liberty’ interest is one so deeply imbedded within society’s traditions as to be
a fundamental right”).
95 DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 17 (2000) (engaging in an
empirical analysis of queer American jurisprudence over the 1980s and 1990s and observing that
custody, visitation, adoption, and foster disputes “are the most important in terms of impact on
the greatest number of gay litigants”).
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three sexual minorities as legal parents.96  As the State continuously
recognizes queer families’ right to recognition, it will need to confront
the inevitability of third party involvement in child rearing.97  Thus,
the State must reassess the power of constitutional rights associated
with childrearing within dyadic parent structures and redefine the pro-
cess for establishing and enforcing parentage.98  While one new,
untraditional model for family took hold in LaChapelle, in which two
parents were granted joint custody and a third was given the right to
participate in important decision-making,99 the future of family is situ-
ational and idiosyncratic, anchored in individualized assessments that
weigh personal agency and child and personal welfare rather than
oppressive notions like biological destiny.100
Despite the potential for queer families to track closely with
dyadic family structures outside the context of conception, queer lib-
eration still serves donor-conceived family communities.  Even when
queer families conform to heteronormative relationships by forming
binary couples and sharing exclusive legal parental rights, these
couples are necessarily precluded from the dual-parent biological
norm, and they inevitably exemplify the durability of kinship net-
works.101  In addition, sexual minorities are more likely than heter-
osexuals to create families through informal agreements with known
donors, and these arrangements foster greater familiarity between
donor and offspring, often resulting in ongoing donor involvement.102
96 LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming a trial
court’s judgment granting one parent sole physical custody and shared legal custody with
another parent and also granting a third parent the right to participate in important decisions
affecting the child in a paternity proceeding brought by a sperm donor after the child’s mother
and her same sex partner severed the donor’s visitation with their child).
97 See Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection: Heteronormativity,
Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 289, 322 (2008) (asserting
that cases involving queer families demonstrate “problems that arise when family law does not
match the lived lives of families”).
98 See id. at 309 (explaining that “even when lesbian and gay couples have children, they
still do not neatly fit into that two parent biologically-based norm”).
99 LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 168.
100 See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. R
101 See Appell, supra note 97, at 308 (arguing that “even those lesbian and gay couples who R
are modeling heteronormativity—binary couples, mutual support, relationships toward children
that reflect adult intimate relationship, and even exclusive (legal) parenting—can and do provide
example of more complex and less domesticated kinship networks that recognize expansive kin
networks”).
102 See id. at 309 (observing that “unlike many heterosexual families created through ART,
lesbians and gays may be more likely to make informal arrangements with known donors or
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Accordingly, sexual minorities have undermined the notion that ano-
nymity is necessary for rearing a third-party’s biological offspring,
steadily developing and reinforcing a legal infrastructure for State rec-
ognition of donor-conceived family communities in the course of their
advancement toward equality.103
IV. THE FUTURE OF FAMILY
The benefits of queer liberation stretch far beyond donor-con-
ceived family communities because liberty-as-dignity links social
advancements across all minority groups.  Advocates for sexual
minorities are no longer fighting for sexual minorities; they are fight-
ing for the liberty of all people.104  While this does not mean that dif-
ferent groups do not have varying legal needs that are not uniformly
met by queer liberation, it does allow advancements to be more cumu-
lative than those won in group-specific equality cases.105  This aggrega-
tion of rights is particularly important in terms of how queer liberation
will broaden the definition of family through reshaping familial struc-
tures to better accommodate respect for individuals’ decisions.  By
facilitating important advancements for gender and racial equality, the
magnification of personal agency in the future of family is a natural
extension of the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of citizenship.
Among queer liberation’s most important potential contributions
to broader society is its transformation of family.  Redefining family
to include sexual minorities signals the vulnerability of additional
exclusionary categorization schemes and establishes the viability of
new family forms in the United States.106  A new definition of family
benefits everyone.  State recognition of queer rights would move the
country away from thinking about family as an inevitability of nature
surrogates to creates their families” and “the birth parents or donors may be involved with the
child on an ongoing basis”).
103 See id. at 302 (describing queer families and asserting that “[t]hese postmodern families
and the porousness of their affective, if not legal, family relations are part of a larger set of
movements that have challenged adoption’s myth of rebirth and mandate of secrecy”).
104 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
105 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 439 (6th ed.
2000) (“[T]he government rarely takes a fundamental right away from all persons . . . .”).
106 See Glazer, supra note 15, at 1024-28 (explaining the importance of examining bisexual
visibility based on the opportunity to understand why society employs polarized classification
schemes that suppress bisexual desire and excludes those outside the current paradigm for sexual
orientation).
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or an expression of predetermined divine principles; more than ever,
family would be the result of the choices we make as communal enti-
ties throughout our lives.107  This new form of family would hinge on
personal agency, carving out communities free from numerous
oppressive forces that interfere with self-determination.108  As a mat-
ter of social justice, redefining family is vital in this new era of liberty-
as-dignity because the redistribution of family recognition deem-
phasizes the protection of the most privileged in favor of promoting
rights for everyone.109
State legitimization of queer families would refute deeply
ingrained notions about gender as a repository for different rights and
responsibilities.  Socially constructed men and women could no longer
be predefined by their lifelong relativity because men and women
could better organize the most fundamental aspects of their lives in
exclusivity.110  From a feminist perspective, this shift would defuse het-
erosexual men’s ability to augment their power through subordinating
women and non-heterosexuals because heterosexual men would be
less likely to sit at the top of patriarchal hierarchies in the home.111
The redistribution of gender in the household would help reframe
popular understandings of gender by eschewing reductionist thinking
about parenthood and revealing gender as vulnerable to intentional
change.112  Because gender is an institution through which humans
organize their lives as well as society, a new consciousness about the
fluidity of gender would tie common values and self-worth to new
107 See Ertman, supra note 83, at 37 (arguing than an effect of new family forms is that R
“family begins to mean the group that people choose rather than one ordained by nature of a
divine authority”).
108 See id. (describing the benefits of new family forms, including increased agency).
109 Cf. Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 935, 949
(1996) (“Our vision of procreative liberty must include the eradication of group oppression, and
not just a concern for protecting the reproductive choices of the most privileged.”).
110 See Judith Lorber, Night to His Day, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 54, 60 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 1994) (defining gender as “a
process of creating distinguishable social statuses for the assignment of rights and responsibili-
ties” that individuals construct and maintain through “social interaction throughout their lives”).
111 See Ertman, supra note 83, at 36 (explaining that “the very heart of feminism is a cri- R
tique of the traditional family, specifically the way that authority rests with men generally and
fathers in particular,” and asserting that “new families undermine the traditional family, a form
that is central to both gender and sexual orientation subordination”).
112 See Lorber, supra note 110, at 55 (describing how parenting is gendered, children and R
young adults perform their gender, and the ways in which the social construction of gender are
subject to change).
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indicators of self, such as motivation and competence, rather than
gender-based stereotypes.113
Dismantling the boundaries of gender helps to unite communities
and enhance social power because gender would be less likely to con-
tribute to division within races and ethnicities.114  Beyond the sphere
of gender, a more flexible understanding of family would respond to
the existing needs of families of color, which frequently transcend the
legal boundaries of the traditional family by including extended rela-
tives and identifying as family those with whom they do not share bio-
logical ties.115  In this way, communities of color transcend racist
ideology tying worth to inherited traits by, for example, accepting as
family those not birthed into a household, and legitimating these
familial structures defies race as a limitation on individual potential.116
Moreover, like gender, race and ethnicity are social institutions.117
American families have reacted throughout history to economic and
legal developments, adapting to meet the disparate needs of different
communities and often responding within the lines of race and ethnic-
ity.118  Increased agency in family formation would improve social
mobility and access to power among families of color who are still
newly benefiting from civil rights legislation and overcoming the eco-
nomic and educational ramifications of American Apartheid.119  For
communities of color, redefining family is vital to embracing new
113 See id. (reflecting on gender as a social institution, claiming that “[o]ne way of choosing
people for the different tasks of society is on the basis of their talents, motivations, and compe-
tence—their demonstrated achievements” while another “is on the basis of gender, race, ethnic-
ity—ascribed membership in a category of people”).
114 See id. at 60 (“As part of a stratification system, gender ranks men above women of the
same race and class.”).
115 See Roberts, supra note 109, at 941-42 (discussing black families and contending that R
their familial networks have traditionally transcended the nuclear family).
116 See id. (“Blacks by and large are more interested in escaping the constraints of racist
ideology by defining themselves apart from inherited traits. They tend to see group membership
as a political and cultural affiliation.  Their family ties have traditionally reached beyond the
bounds of the nuclear family to include extended kin and non-kin relationships.”).
117 See ROBERTA L. COLES, RACE & FAMILY: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH 249 (2006)
(“Variations in skin tone play a covert but important role in social status.”).
118 See id. at 33 (explaining that American families are “fluid and dynamic, they have
adapted to a swiftly forming country encountering major social and economic transformations”).
119 See id. at 19 (asserting that income and educational factors distribute occupational cate-
gories across people of color and that “for many minority families, the relatively recent applica-
tion of antidiscrimination policies has resulted in this being their first generation of college
graduates and/or holders of previously prohibited occupations”).
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opportunities and retiring various forms of segregation that have sub-
jugated segments of the United States for centuries.120
These contributions to racial and gender equality demonstrate
the significance of family redefinition as a valid consequence of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  The equal citizenship guarantee of the Four-
teenth Amendment has gradually destabilized hierarchies in the
United States and extended the claim of equal citizenship to an
increasing number of subordinated groups and individuals.121  If queer
liberation flows from the promise of equal citizenship, then so should
State recognition of new forms of family.122  Family will not be
whatever an individual wants it to be, but, in the absence of tradition,
families will spring from personal agency, shared liberty, and dignity,
as well as consideration for child and personal welfare, redefining the
nation while enriching an essential element of citizens’ lives.
Diversity has consequences.  The various social groups surround-
ing us transform democracy, shape the economy, and strengthen or
undermine our health and safety.123  New groups and newly visible
groups are constantly increasing, and their presence demands that
individuals expand their “sense of we” to facilitate the maximal bene-
fits of heightened diversity.124  Enhanced rights for sexual minorities
are likely to improve rights for donor-conceived family communities
and other groups because the legal advancements and ongoing social
120 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGA-
TION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 149 (1993) (explaining that individual traits
depend on family and that aspects of family background, “such as wealth and social connections,
open the doors of opportunity irrespective of education or motivation”).
121 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection,
47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1184-86 (2000) (describing the expansion of rights under the due pro-
cess clause as destabilizing to hierarchies in the United States and allowing subordinated groups
to bring claims of equal citizenship).
122 See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text. R
123 See Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First
Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 138 (2007) (exploring the implications of social
networks on bystanders and their impact on health, economy, and democracy).
124 See id. at 138-39 (asserting that diversity will increase substantially in all modern socie-
ties and that “the central challenge for modern, diversifying societies is to create a new, broader
sense of ‘we’”).  This Paper employs “sense of we” as a proxy for the social categorization and
related cognitive mechanisms that shape intergroup biases and in particular how one differenti-
ates the self from others. See John F. Dovidio et al., Commonality and the Complexity of “We”:
Social Attitudes and Social Change, 13 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 3, 4-5 (2009) (explaining
that “[s]ocial categorization and associated psychological processes play a critical role in the
formation and perpetuation of intergroup biases” and that differentiating between “we’s” and
“they’s” is consequential to individual behavior, social perception, and cognition).
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legitimization of sexual minorities should demonstrate that diversity is
an asset.125  The intense controversy associated with sexual minorities
suggests a continuous focus on the group for years to come, and the
integration of sexual minority rights into those of heterosexuals is
likely to garner unwavering attention.126  Thus, if there is truth to the
argument that increased diversity has a favorable net-effect on soci-
ety,127 the public should see positive outcomes from queer empower-
ment that could then be extrapolated to advocacy efforts for legal
recognition of other families throughout society.
CONCLUSION
The State has wielded the concept of the traditional family as an
oppressive instrument of social control and unjustly granted or denied
legal recognitions to different groups within the United States.  But
for sexual minorities, liberty-as-dignity is a readied mechanism to
achieve equality.128  Queer liberation would enhance choice in the
context of marriage and childrearing, laying the foundation for the
legal recognition of donor-conceived family communities and redefin-
ing the bonds linking spouses, children, siblings, and parents.129  This
redefinition would make family a function of personal agency rather
than a destination beyond self-determination, and redefinition serves
the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment by empowering histori-
cally subjugated classes.130  Liberty-as-dignity guarantees new choices
for all groups, and queer liberation stands to fundamentally alter the
boundaries of family and, thus, the organization of the entire nation.
125 See Putnam, supra note 123, at 140-41 (explaining that an increasingly diverse society is R
inevitable and “diversity will be a valuable national asset” because immigration and diversity
enhance creativity, spur development, and are associated with economic growth).
126 See Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-Sex
Marriage, 71 MD L. REV. 471, 472 (2012) (explaining that sexual minorities’ “latest string of
victories has been won through high-profile, hard-fought legislative battles—a fact that reveals
the power of constitutionally grounded principles of liberty, equality, and dignity to resonate far
beyond the courthouse door in a dynamic and interactive process of judicial, political, and popu-
lar constitutional interpretation and social movement struggle”).
127 See generally Putnam, supra note 123, at 140-41. R
128 See supra Part II.
129 See supra Part III.
130 See supra Part IV.
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